

Understanding Sudan Conflict and Its Political Economy Implications in Southern Sudan

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Available online at: www.isroset.org

Received: 07/Feb/2019, Accepted: 21/Feb/2019, Online: 28/Feb/2019

Abstract: Since pre-colonial and post-colonial era relations between Sudan and South Sudan has been characterized by the following; political and economic marginalization of South Sudan through under representation, discrimination and other restrictions that did not permits south Sudanese to occupy certain important constitutional posts. The aims of this paper is to interrogates how the imposition of Arabic language and culture on the people of south Sudan led to conflict, because northern Sudan are predominantly Arabs and Muslim while southern Sudan are black Africans with majority of them being Christians or animist. This article relies on content analysis that is secondary method of data analysis and qualitative descriptive techniques, this paper adopt relative Deprivation theory. This study also argue that abolition of Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 which grand southern Sudan semi- autonomous regional status, and the amalgamation of northern Sudan and south Sudan by the colonial masters in 1947 as a single entity without consulting the people of south Sudan is a mistake, because, north Sudan and south Sudan were administer differently by the Britain as a two separate countries, and couple with these ideological differences led to retardation and neglect of socio political and economic development in South Sudan and serve as a factor that cause both first and second Sudan civil war.

Keywords: Understanding, Sudan, Conflicts, Political Economy, Implications, Southern Sudan.

I. INTRODUCTION

North Africa has been under a process of Islamization since the 8th century due to the process of Arab expansion, and despite being well successful in Northern Sudan, this process encountered some difficulties reaching the South Sudan, not only due to the region's geography, but also due to the resistance of animist tribes in this area to conversion (Sharkey, 2008) [1]. However, this geographic characteristics helped to contain the Islamization process in the North region of the country until the 19th century, but by the first half of the 19th century the Sudanese government started a series of campaigns to take control of the south of the country by the process of Islamic imposition. Furthermore, the existence of ethnic boundaries became clearer with the uneven economic development among the regions of Sudan. The northern Sudan benefited from large irrigation systems, of cotton plantation for the British textile factories and the south Sudan was considered as having nothing worthy of investment Ahmad, (2010:4) [2] Besides, the periphery's relationship with the central government, also has been characterized by slave trade, exploitation and marginalization Ahamed, (2010:3) [2].

Before the Turko-Egyptian invasion of 1821, the Sudan consisted of kingdoms and tribal communities without modern form of government as we have today. In other words, Sudan in its present boundaries did not exist (Reik, 1995) [3]. Similarly the Mahdist administration of 1813-1898 did not succeed to impose its full authority on the whole Sudan. The Belgians in 1893, advancing from the Belgians Congo now (DR Congo) capture western Equatorial up to Mongolla and established the Lad enclave as part of the Belgian Congo. During the same period (1892), the French led by major marchand occupied large parts of South Sudan (Bahr el Ghazal, western upper Nile up to Fashoda) and by 1896 they had established a firm administration in these areas. Another French expedition which started off in 1897 from Djiboti moving through Ethiopia and along the Boro and Sobat rivers failed to link up with Fashoda expedition. The French had wanted to annex south Sudan to the French territories in West Africa. However, international conflicts developed between the British and the French over South Sudan commonly

known as the Fashoda incident. Again, 1898 the Sudan was re-conquered by the joint British and Egyptian to administer the Sudan in its present boundaries (Riek, 1995). [3].

In 1899, the British and French concluded an agreement in Europe which made the French pull out of South Sudan handing over its portion of Sudan to the same authorities who were already in control of north Sudan. A similar incident took place in 1910 when the Belgians withdrew from the Fashoda enclave after an agreement was concluded in 1896 stipulating that the enclave was to be handed over to the British after the death of King Leopold. The king died in 1910. The withdrawal of the French and Belgians from South Sudan ceded the Territory to the British (Riek, 1995) [3].

From 1870 on, humanitarian pressures started to be made on the Turkish-Egyptian regime in order to end the slave trade. The process dragged on for some time being important to notice the Anglo-Egyptian Anti-Slavery Convention in 1877 and was only completed in the last decades of the nineteenth century (Sikainga, 1996: 14) [4]. The end of slave traffic led Sudan into a state of economic crisis, since the activity was the country's main income source, and this crisis led the government to raise taxes which was one of the causes of the insurrection of 1885 Queiroz *et al.* (2011; 309) [5]. Mahdi, the leader of this insurgency, ineffectively tried to integrate the Sudanese regions through the imposition of the Islamic Legal System - the Sharia; however this decision failed to achieve the expected success in Sudan and only worsened the division between North and South Queiroz *et al.* (2011: 309) [5].

With the Egyptian-British invasion in 1898, the Anglo-Egyptian condominium took place, in which Britain and Egypt shared sovereignty on Sudan after the collapse of the Mahdist State in 1899 Collins, (2008;33) [6]. This hybrid solution defended "British imperial interests at Cairo and Suez by securing the upper Nile waters" and also recovered to British control "the former Sudanese provinces belonging to the Khedive of Egypt" Collins (2008: 33) [6].

British rule, then, encouraged the arrival of Christian missionaries to the south Sudan and the expansion of Islamic culture was barred. Christian missionaries were encouraged to "convert the Southern Sudanese from their traditional religions to Christianity, teach them English, discourage the use of Arabic, and even prohibit the wearing of Arab clothing" Collins (2008;35). The educational monopoly held by these missionaries did not encourage the southerners' participation in the politics of Sudan, contrarily to what happened in the north, where the elites engaged in maneuvers to defend the independence of the country Collins (2005;269) [7].

The nationalist movement that emerged in the 1930s, the Sudanese independence occurred only in 1956 Collins (2008; 45) [6]. The State-promoted policy of Arabization began in the 1950s, when the northern nationalists formulated plans to introduce Arabic in schools in the South Sudan, but the existence of some British policies that protected the southern Sudanese prevented this arbitrary action from taking place. The process of Sudanization contributed to increase in the southern Sudan the perception of injustice and inequality the South Sudan were under, and fueled the uprising that began a few months before the declaration of independence. This uprising happened in the form of a rebellion of Southern Corps of Sudan's Defense Force - a process initiated in August 15, 1955 in the city of Torit Ahmed (2010;4) [2].

The conflicts that followed represented the beginning of the first Sudanese Civil War which ended only seventeen years later. As Sudan became independent in 1956, Arabic became the official language and Islam, the state religion Sharkey, (2007; 34) [1]. The Condominium ended and a parliamentary board took office, but this political maneuver quickly went wrong as in 1958 Major-General Ibrahim 'Abboud took over as new Prime-Minister Collins (2008; 73) [6].

Therefore this paper was sub-divided into nine following sub-headings they are: conceptual clarification of terms, Theoretical Framework, The British Separate Administration Policy In South Sudan From 1898 -1947 Known As "Southern Policy," The British Amalgamation of Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan of 1947 is a "Mistake," The Imposition of Arabic Language And their Implications, The Abolition of Addis Ababa Agreement, Peace agreement, referendum and secession of southern Sudan, from Sudan, Current Political Crisis between Sudan and South Sudan, and the Conclusion.

II. METHODOLOGY

The method adopted in the course of this research is content analysis using mainly secondary data. Which include existing literature on the topic such as text books, journals, conference papers, newspapers and other related published documents.

Conceptual Clarification of Terms:

The Concept of Conflict

Conflict is a struggle or contest between people with opposing needs, ideas, beliefs, values, or goals. Defined in broadest terms, conflict denotes the incompatibility of subject positions (Diez *et al.*, 2006: 565) [8]. This definition emphasizes the opposition or incompatibility at the heart of the conflict, and initially leaves open the exact nature of these incompatibilities that is whether they are between individuals, groups or societal positions; whether they rest in different interests or beliefs; or whether they have a material existence or come into being only through discourse. Conflict can be defined from the tendency of human beings to become antagonistic, particularly when they are faced with irreconcilable or opposing views Charplin (1979) [9]. Conflict is defined as an incompatibility of goals or values between two or more parties in relationship, combined with attempts to control each other and antagonistic feelings toward each other (Fisher, 1990) [10]. The incompatibility or difference may exist in reality or may only be perceived by the parties involved. Nonetheless, the opposing actions and the hostile emotions are very real hallmarks of human conflict. Conflict has the potential for either a great deal of destruction or much creativity and positive social change (Kriesberg, 1998) [11].

III CONCEPT OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

Political economy is concerned with the allocation of scarce resources in a world of infinite wants and needs. In order to allocate these resources; politics are used within a state to provide for the people. Political economy is the study of the relationships between individuals and society, and more specifically, the relationships between citizens and the state. Political economy is a mixture of politics, Economics, sociology, philosophy, and history, which bring together evidence to the study of how human, exist within societies. Political economists study political ideology, economic structure human's interaction, human nature, and theories in philosophical thought. It is a study that studies not only the mechanics of a particular structure, but also the reasoning behind why a structure regarded to be the best by various people with different beliefs (Wiki books, 2016) [12]. Political economy in the widest sense, is the science of the laws governing the production and exchange of material means of subsistence in human society (Frederick, 1877) [13].

IV THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Therefore, for us to have a better understanding of this study, the theoretical framework adopted for this work is Relative Deprivation theory. This theory was propounded by Dollard, Millard, *et al.* (1939) [14], were the first to proposed the theory, postulating that frustration leads men to act aggressively Gurr (1970) [15] explains in his work "why men Rebels" that instead of an absolute standard of deprivation, a gap between expected and achieved welfare creates collective discontent. This theory also applies to individuals who find their own welfare to be inferior to that of others to whom they compare themselves Gurr (1970) [15]. Explains political violence as the result of collective discontent caused by a sense of relative deprivation. He writes, "Relative deprivation' is the term used to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the "ought" and the "is" of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence." This gap between an individual's expected and achieved welfare results in collective discontent.

Walter G., defines the preconditions of "relative" deprivation as follows (where Person A feels deprived of object X): Person A does not have X; Person A wants to have X; Person A knows of other people who have X; Person A believes obtaining X is realistic. How might feelings of relative deprivation translate into terrorism? Gurr (1970) [15] provide a psychological approach to explain how collective discontent is manifested as political violence: "The primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism the anger induced by frustration is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities". It is as a result of political and economic disparities between the people of North Sudan and South Sudan that cause conflict [15].

The British Separate Administration Policy in South Sudan from 1898 -1947 known as "Southern Policy"

Owing to the geographical, political, historical and cultural differences between north and south Sudan, the British devised a system of separate administration for the two countries. To guarantee the effectiveness of the separate administration policy, the British passed the closed districts ordinances of 1920. This ordinance required the use of passport and permits for travelers shuttling between the two countries of north and south Sudan, and the permits were used to specify the condition and the purpose of the visits. The immigration policy was further strengthened by the permit to conduct trades in south Sudan Riek (1995) [3].

Finally, a language policy was developed and enforced in south Sudan and approved the use of the following local languages; Dinka, Bari, Nuer, Latuko, Shiluk and Azande. Arabic was categorically rejected as a language in south Sudan. The cumulative effect of the immigration and trade laws coupled with the language policy was to maintain south Sudan. In fact, colonial governors from south Sudan used to attend their regular administrative conference in east Africa instead of Khartoum. After the establishment of the condominium rule, the British continued to consolidate its position in north Sudan by creating the necessary administrative and political structure for the state of north Sudan. In an effort to prepare the north Sudan for self-rule, the north Sudan advisory council ordinance was enacted in 1945. The ordinance covered all six north Sudan provinces; comprising of Khartoum, Kordofan, Darfur, Eastern, northern and Blue Nile provinces; this council was empowered to advise north Sudan in certain specific areas. Members of the advisory council were all north Sudanese. The ordinance had no application or relevance to territory of southern Sudan. Thus north Sudan and south Sudan were regarded as two separate countries colonized by the British and Egyptians (Riek, 1995) [3].

During the colonial period, the British did not govern one Sudan but rather two: the North Sudan and the South Sudan. Hence, despite the international recognition of a territorial unit called "Sudan" or "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan," British policies strengthened the idea and the reality of two separate Sudans. Why did the British administer separately the North Sudan and the South Sudan until 1947? British officials often referred to cultural and religious differences between a predominantly Arabic speaking Muslim North and "animist" and Christian South Sudan. In fact, the emphasis is on real and imagined differences was closely linked to British attempts to prevent Arabic culture and Islamic values from spreading into southern Sudan, a process that had started unfolding in previous centuries. Thus the British gave a free hand to Christian missionaries in the South Sudan while considerably restricting their presence in the North Sudan. They also expressed concern for the well-being of southern Sudan populations, which they perceived as easy prey for northern "Arab" slave traders David (1999) [16].

This preoccupation was connected to the long history of slavery in Sudan, but it was consciously used to legitimize separate rule. In addition, the "Southern Policy" allowed the British to concentrate scarce economic resources in the North Sudan while limiting expenditure in what they considered the "barbaric" South Sudan. The Southern Policy touched upon various aspects of government and social life. The language of administration was Arabic in the North Sudan, English in the South Sudan. Whereas a government educational system was gradually developed in North Sudan, education was left to missionaries in the South Sudan. The circulation of people and goods between the two areas was severely restricted from 1922 onwards. Southern Sudan were forbidden to bear Arabic names and "mixed" marriages involving northern Sudan and southern Sudanese were strongly discouraged Abdal-Rahim (1965) [17].

The British Amalgamation of Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan of 1947 is a "Mistake"

To Amom see the British Amalgamation of northern Sudan and southern Sudan of 1947 is a mistake because the colonial masters decided to merge the two countries into one entity without consulting the views of the soothers. Instead of establishing an advisory council for south Sudan similar to that of the north Sudan, the resolutions of the administrative conference held in Khartoum in 1946 surprisingly advocated for the colonization of south Sudan by north Sudan. It must, however, be pointed out that the conference took the decision at the back of the people of south Sudan as they were not represented, and because the conference was meant for administrators in north Sudan only, the British administrators in south Sudan did not attend consequently. This unexpected outcome revealed the conspiracy the British and north Sudanese supported by Egypt to hand south Sudan to north Sudan as a colonial Territory. Certainly, this plan provoked bitter reaction from the south Sudanese and their sympathizer. The betrayal of south Sudan by the British was finally concluded in the infamous juba conference of 1947. Precisely the conference was convened to inform the chiefs of south Sudan of their irreversible decision to hand over south Sudan. This unpalatable decision was crowned by the promulgation and establishment of the Sudan legislative assembly in 1948. Thirteen (13) Delegates from south Sudan were handpicked and forced to represent south Sudanese in the assembly (Riek, 1995) [3].

The Cairo agreement of 1953 was no exception to the rule, once again the colonial masters from Britain and north Sudan masquerading as representatives of national political parties with tacit support from the Egyptian government conspired to grand self-determination to the Sudan without the participation of south Sudanese. The people of south Sudan were deliberately excluded on the pretext that they had no political parties. This was yet another ploy made by political parties of north Sudan with the erroneous and unjustifiable assumption that Sudan is one country. Nevertheless, the people of south Sudan regard themselves as 'internally colonized people'. The deliberate handover of south Sudan to north Sudan by the Britain was one of the greatest blunders ever made in the diplomacy of the British colonial history. If the British had felt that south Sudan was not yet ready to become an independent state by itself then, they should have either handed over its administration to an international body like the United Nations instead of north Sudan or should have left northern Sudan to get independence separately as they did with northern Rhodesia. It is now up to the British to correct this serious error of judgment that has cost

millions of lives of the people of south Sudan, by supporting the call of the people of south Sudan for full independence Riek (1995) [3].

The prominent southerners questioned the decision to administratively unify Sudan, while it was argued that resuming northern domination might result in a violent response as it had in the 19th century. This was partly because the southerners had not been heard in the Sudan administrative conference of 1946 regarding their concerns on the unification issue John (1998). Most of the British officials posted in the South Sudan opposed the reversal of the Southern Policy, fearing that northern Sudan officials would seek to impose their Arab and Islamic culture upon the Southern Sudanese. They also condemned the fact that not one single southern representative had been consulted on the unification issue, Bashir (1965) [18].

According to Adar (2001; 88-89), the contrasts brought about by the British administration and the subsequent economic, political and infrastructural underdevelopment of the South enhanced southern aspirations and consciousness. Thus, Sudan had within itself “two contrasting visions for the nation – an Arab-Islamic vision and a secular black African vision” Deng (2006; 156) [19].

The Imposition of Arabic language and their Implications

However, it is important to remember the historical inter-regional relationship, which was largely based on violent extraction of resources from Southern Sudan to feed the Northern Sudan economy (Hassan, 2000). Meanwhile the South Sudan was subjected to slave raiding and extraction of resources such as livestock and ivory (David, 1978). [20] This history partly explains the emergence of Northern Arab-Muslim domination. It also helps to understand how the imposition of Arabism and Islam has become a means of nation building and how those who do not identify with these pillars of ‘national identity’ have been politically marginalized and economically excluded (Ylonen, 2005) [21].

It was this inter-group and inter-regional relationship that resulted in peripheral grievances during the preparation for independence, since the Northern elite exclusively inherited political control (IGC, 2004). This occurred because the official administrative language of the South, which had been English during the Condominium period, was arbitrarily changed to Arabic. While the language policy favored northern Sudan in obtaining positions in the South Sudan it also prevented access of most southerners to local administration David (1978). Although by 1954 eight hundred administrative posts had been ‘Sudanese’ only six junior level positions were filled by southerners (Mohammed, 1999) [22]. As the British colonial masters prepared Sudan for independence in the 1940s they were increasingly inclined to listen to the demands of the Khartoum Graduate College educated nationalists. This group of northerners advanced its Arab-Muslim character as the basis of national identity for the self-governed Sudan (John, 1998) [23].

According to Adar whereas conflict in Sudan has acquired a multidimensional character over the years, the main belligerents have been the Arab-speaking Muslims of the north and the southern black Sudanese. At the core of the civil war are the inherently exclusive ethno-religious-centered policies, namely Islamization and Arabization pursued in various ways in successive Sudanese administrations since the 1950s Adar (2001; 81) [24]. As Deng (2006, 155), 27 stated; the constant situation of war in Sudan since its independence on January 1, 1956 revealed a crisis of national identity. As previously seen, after independence the North prevailed over the South and started a process of Arabization and Islamization of Sudan.

However, notwithstanding such policies, the South developed a distinct identity. As they had historically been victims of enslavement, they developed a strong anti-slavery sentiment which added to anti-Arabization and anti-Islamization sentiments. The influences of a separatist colonial policy, Christianity, and elements of Western Culture created a South Sudan identity which is different from that of the Arab-Islamic North. Besides, in the early 1950s the southerners were increasingly concerned about the transfer of power to the northern Arab-Muslim elite because they found the North Sudan no more familiar than the British, or earlier Egyptian masters Deng (2006; 156) [25].

According to Deng (1995), stated: “For the South independence was to prove merely a change of outside masters, with the northerners taking over from the British and defining the nation in accordance with the symbols of their Arabic-Islamic identity. By the end of 1954 almost all colonial administrators had been predominantly replaced by the northern Sudanese. In addition, after the parliamentary elections gave the northern elite control of the central government, the southerners perceived themselves politically excluded. According to Johnson (2003) [26], stated that:

In 1959, Sudan nationalized the Southern mission schools. This nationalization came as a governmental policy to implement Arabic as the official language, and to construct mosques and Koranic schools. These actions, which sought the integration of the country, thus, tried to impose Arabization and Islamization over the entire Sudan. The first participation of the separatist

group Anya-Nya happened as a rebellion in the South in 1963 and led to constant ill-coordinated attacks from this group (Collins, 2008:84) [6].

Nevertheless, many governments kept 'Abdoud' successful policies of Islamization and Arabization until the signature of the Addis Ababa Agreement, in 1972. This agreement granted autonomy to the South of Sudan recognizing a Regional Self-Government to the region, with a legislative body (Regional People's Assembly) an executive in charge of public affairs and administration (High Executive Council). The agreement also accepted English as the "main language of the Southern Region" and decided that the number of soldiers and officers in the Sudanese army would be proportional to the population of each region (The Agreement Addis Ababa, 1972:..2) [27].

The Abolition of Addis Ababa Agreement

The Nimeiri regime's tampering with south Sudan political rights in order to gain authority over natural resources located in the South played an important role in the emergence of the second rebellion. This was undertaken through renewed political marginalization of the South and infringement of its regional autonomy through abolition of the right to tax the extraction of natural resources in its territory Abel (1990). Due to poor management of the national economy the Nimeiri regime found itself in overwhelming debt by the late 1970s and in a situation where the economic crisis escalated Bodour (1991) [28].

However, discovery of oil in the South provided a possibility to escape the economic decline and the resulting popular discontent (Melvill, 2002) [29]. This contributed to the incentive to violate the 1972 Addis Ababa peace provisions that had given the South restricted financial autonomy and the right to collect all central government taxes from industrial, commercial, and agricultural ventures on its territory Abel (1990) [30].

After the oil discoveries were made, the Addis Ababa conditions were repeatedly violated as the government attempted to access the petroleum. Renewed political marginalization of the South was undertaken in three ways. First, Nimeiri initiated the efforts to disrupt the southern political order through interventions, by suspending the regional assembly several times, while pushing southern representation out of the central government in the late 1970s in an effort to appease northern factions that opposed the Addis Ababa peace treaty John (1998) [32]. Second, as a result of the regime's willingness to control the oil fields, it began replacing southern troops in their proximity, with northern army units. Third, the government redrew provincial boundaries, carving the oil region out of the southern territory by establishing Unity Province, thus removing the jurisdiction of the oil fields from the South, Melvill (1998) [30].

Once the first oil licensing contracts were signed, the revenues were not handed over to the southern regional government that was supposed to administer them according to the Addis Ababa treaty. At the same time, the regime initiated plans to build a pipeline from the Unity Province to Port Sudan to facilitate oil exportation. Furthermore, in order to secure oil extraction through more political reforms in June 1983, Nimeiri partitioned the South through ethnic lines to diminish its political power. Consequently, the South was divided into its three original provinces established during the colonial period, while Nimeiri attempted to obscure his intentions by claiming that the partition was to reduce the influence of the South's largest Dinka ethnic group Deng (1991) [31].

The discovery of oil reserves in the South Sudan. The Khartoum government proposed to build a pipeline to explore southern oil which would go "through East Africa and Southern Sudan to Mombasa" Collins, (2008:123) 6. Waves of protest took the streets of southern Sudan and were widely reported by American media. However, since the 1970's investments were concentrated in specific regions of Sudan, leaving "the South Sudan, 'Sudanization' was thus tantamount to "Northernization" (Africa Watch, 1990; 13) [32].

Nimeiri faced a growing threat to his political power in the late 1970s due to the declining economy and the discontent of the Islamist factions because the Addis Ababa peace agreement had been viewed negatively within the conservative circles in the North. Consequently, he attempted to appease the dissatisfied northern factions and reaffirmed Islam's position, which he had earlier challenged. Later, this culminated in the appointment of Islamists to positions in the state apparatus and recognition of the Islamic law, Sharia, as the source of all legislation (Johnson, 2003) [26].

Under pressure, Nimeiri felt obliged to appoint Turabi as the Attorney General in 1983, demonstrating the peak of the secretly conducted infiltration of the Muslim Brothers into the state apparatus and the military. After assuming the position, Turabi ordered the Sharia be used as the basis of state law, thereby marginalizing the periphery that did not identify with Islam. This was particularly the case in the Animist and Christian South, where people found the extension of Islamic law particularly oppressive Carolyn (1999). Collins (2008: 138) 6 emphasizes the difficulties of this process, stating:

The sum of all these events revitalized old hostilities and culminated in military mutinies over Sudan. The Second Civil War had, then, begun. Alongside, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by Col. John Garang, emerged in 1983 with a manifesto that diverged from those of other existing groups because of their preoccupation not only with the southern problems, but with the whole situation of Sudan (Ahamed, 2010:6) [2].

Peace Agreement, Referendum and Secession of Southern Sudan, from Sudan.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, also known as the Naivasha Agreement, was signed on January 9, 2005 in a grand celebration in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital. The agreement was signed by John Garang, chairman of the South Sudan people Liberation Movement/Army and the Sudan Vice-President 'Ali 'Uthman Muhammad Taha and arose due to a situation of international pressure created by the genocide in Darfur and the country's twenty-two years of civil war. The IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) Declaration of 1994 and the Machakos Protocol in 2002 were the backbone of the CPA. "The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) aimed at identifying the root causes of the political conflict, eliminating historical injustices and avoiding the losses of the wars and destruction" (Ahamed, 2010:7) [2].

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was a complex document. It dealt with security, distribution of power and wealth issues and ended almost 40 years of civil war between northern and southern Sudan. Thereby, security was regarded by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as the most important issue to be dealt with, and it should be established through the maintenance of armed forces separating North and South of Sudan and the withdrawal of northern troops from southern lands. The South Sudan liberation Army, on the other hand, would withdraw from the North within eight months. The matter of wealth division, especially oil, was resolved through an agreement of sharing the revenues between the Khartoum government and the government of South Sudan. The solution found for the power dilemma was to create an autonomous Government of South Sudan for a period of six years, and after the expiration of such period there would be a referendum, scheduled for the year 2011, which would be supervised by international monitors (Collins, 2008:269) [6].

The referendum was an opportunity to the inhabitants of southern Sudan to separate them from the north of the country and to constitute a sovereign and independent state. Voting was guaranteed to all those who could prove they were southern Sudanese or had family in the South – including, therefore, many southern Sudanese who lived in the north. Downie, (2010) [32]. The referendum for southern Sudan came as a relief to many years of political, cultural and religious oppression "a struggle that has cost more than two (2) million lives" (Downie, 2010) [32]. The referendum took place between 9 and 15 of January, 2011 and the results published on February 7, 2011 showed a 98.83% approval for the secession of South Sudan. The date chosen for the establishment of South Sudan as an independent state was July 9, 2011. Atta-Asamoah, (2011) [33]. The newest country in the world was well received by global leaders and is already recognized by the United Nations as the 193rd member of the organization (South Sudan, 2011) [34].

Current Political Crisis between Sudan and South Sudan

The political control over the areas of Abyei, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile State has been a controversial issue in the Sudanese peace process since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005. According to a United Nations Development Program for Sudan (UNDP Sudan) document (2011), [35] these areas are object of dispute between the North and the South due to their natural resources, especially oil reserves. The Northern-Southern borders established in the CPA were based on the 1956 independence boundaries; however, this criterion did not apply to the areas in question. Indeed, two special protocols – which later became a part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, were created in 2004 to address the situation in Abyei, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile State (UNDP Sudan, 2011) [35].

The independence of South Sudan reinforces the need to reach an agreement on the border demarcation of these areas and on what country each region will join. The Abyei area is the most problematic. Under the Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, the region was to receive a special administrative status and to be governed by a local Executive Council for an interim period. At the end of this period, Abyei was supposed to have a referendum, at the same time as the South Sudanese plebiscite, to decide which nation to join (UNMIS, 2009:1) [36]. Nevertheless, the referendum has not yet taken place, and Abyei's status remains a source of disagreements between Sudan and South Sudan. According to International Crisis Group (ICG) policy briefing (2008:9) [37]

Abyei, Sudan/South Sudan — Landlocked and lawless, the region of Abyei straddles Sudan and war-torn South Sudan's borders, yet the arid expanse belongs to neither country. When the two countries signed a comprehensive peace agreement in 2005, which led to South Sudan's independence, they couldn't agree on boundary lines. As a result, Abyei's status remains unresolved to this day. The oil-rich Abyei box, as it's called, is shared by the Misseriya Arab nomads from the north Southern

and the NgokDinka, a South Sudanese cattle-herding tribe. After fighting erupted in 2011, Sudan and South Sudan agreed to allow a neutral peacekeeping mission to foster security until a political solution was reached. Seven years later, political stalemate in the contested region is threatening to destabilize an already fragile region. With no government, judicial system, or police force, Abyei's region is with population of 165,000 Sudanese and South Sudanese inhabitants depend on thousands of Ethiopian peacekeepers, part of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, to maintain stability, if the U.N. withdraws peacekeepers from a long-contested oil-rich enclave, it's likely to spark further fighting in an already unstable region Sam, (2018) [38].

V. CONCLUSION

Conflict between north Sudan and south Sudan started since before Independence, it as a result of political and economic marginalization of south Sudan after independence, the north Sudanese elites failed to evolve policies that would have consolidated national unity and stability. As a result, the Sudan has been plunged into continuous state of political, economic, constitutional, and military crisis. Various government and regimes in Khartoum waged war and denied the south Sudanese equality, social justice, freedom and effective participation in the running of the state, and that serve as a factor that cause first and second civil war in Sudan.

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