



The Effects the Diversity in the Person-Situation Debate has on Virtue Ethics

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Abstract—Aristotle's virtue ethics hinges profoundly on both a characterological moral psychology and the notion of practical wisdom. Nevertheless, currently psychological researches have funnelled to debates on the influence of humans character traits on their behaviour, as well as on the likelihood of practical wisdom as vigorous deliberation. According to these researches, humans act differently than usual on the basis of the Aristotelian observation on character, and for the most part, the cognitive processes that sway humans' behaviour are significantly mechanical and unreflective. Founded on the upshots of these researches, some philosophers, identified as situationists, have averred that mans' behaviour is swayed predominantly by situational undercurrents and not by their character. This argument between virtue ethicists thoughts, and situationists view on the other hand, is also recognized as the person-situation debate. The objective of this paper is to explore the person-situation debate and examine the upshots of the psychological description of the situationists for virtue ethics. Three positions will be considered herein: the virtue ethical stance, the situationists' stance, and an integrating position. After considering these three positions the significances of the person-situation debate for virtue ethics will be considered.

Keywords— Virtue Ethics, Situationism, the Person-Situation Debate

I. INTRODUCTION

The virtue ethical application of character is dual: on the one hand, it is a psychological description of how and why humans behave as they do, which enables them to determine how people will generally behave. Conversely, language on character is employed to assess people's behaviour and suggest how people should behave [1]. According to Doris [2], situationism places the virtue ethicists in a dilemma: if the virtue ethicist maintains that character is the chief influence on human behaviour, he is susceptible to negative empirical evaluation. Nevertheless, if the virtue ethicist denies his psychological assertions and highlights the ethical arguments on how humans should behave to steer people's behaviour, the subject ensues; how he can suggest a psychological explanation that is not realistic for (most) human beings, which will end in a trouncing of virtue ethics' practical pull. Doris consequently argues that, in the light of this dilemma, situationism presents a superior psychological explanation and hence "enjoys certain advantages over Aristotelianism as a foundation for normative [or prescriptive] thought" [2]. In the same way, Doris argues that situationism presents a superior psychological explanation to suggest how humans should behave. The upshots of situationism's psychological explanation can be dual. As Kristján Krisjánsson elucidates: "The results of these experiments, then, are deemed at least sufficient to shake our previously imperturbable confidence in the existence of consistent

cross-situational dispositions [...and are] at most even sufficient to eliminate the very idea of character and damn the entire fields of virtue ethics and character education" [3]. If the situationists are accurate in maintaining that character traits in the Aristotelian sense do not act as the chief influence on human behaviour, then people should at least question their previous belief in their role. At most, one should question one's entire conceptual perception of character, virtue ethics and the principles one applies to suggest how people should behave. In this work, it is intended that the person-situation debate is examined and the upshots of the psychological explanation of the situationists explored for virtue ethics. This study will therefore answer the following research question: How can Aristotelian virtue ethicists realistically react to the criticism of the situationists? This research question surfaced to a degree out of the present researcher's scrutiny on the debate as well as out of the literature. While making sense of the literature it became apparent that the superlative way to clarify the debate was by contrasting the two stances (virtue ethics and situationism). Nevertheless, it also became apparent that virtue ethics became more relatable as a theory than situationism in the light of this work. This research thus decided (if possible) to argue in favour of this appeal to virtue ethics by upholding virtue ethics against situationism. This is why this research question is developed from the virtue ethical view and incorporates the word 'convincingly'. This means that first the debate needed to be explained before an evaluation of

the diverse ways in which the virtue ethicists can react to the situationists. It also entails that, to give a comprehensive view, a third stance in the debate has to be raised: the integrating stance.

The aim of this work is to offer a synopsis of the types of arguments that are employed in the philosophical person-situation debate, and consider the upshots this argument has for virtue ethics. In their article; "The Person-Situation Debate in Historical and Current Perspective" [4], Epstein and O'Brien examine the historical backdrop of the person-situation debate in psychology, and four classical researches that are employed to uphold the arguments of the situationists. After this, they query the situationists' results and make up the balance of which queries have and have not been reacted to by the situationists. It is believed herein, that Epstein and O'Brien's article is one of the last articles that offer an outline of the experiments and the types of arguments used in the person-situation debate. Their article, still, only considers the history of and the (then) recent person-situation debate in psychology. The person-situation debate has steered its way into philosophy after the person-situation debate in psychology. This study therefore intends to attempt to do the same for the person-situation debate in philosophy as Epstein and O'Brien realised for the person-situation debate in psychology; to provide an overview of the diverse types of arguments employed in the person-situation debate in philosophy, as well as study the upshots of these arguments for virtue ethics. To explain the diverse argument employed in the debate it will also be essential to understand more about the tests presented most as evidence for the situationists' assertions.

So much has before now, been written on the diverse philosophical arguments for or against situationism. In scrutinizing this literature, it is discovered that what was wanting, was an article that provided an overview of the diverse types of arguments that are employed in the person-situation debate in philosophy. The theoretical significance of this study is thus to attempt to present an up-to-date overview of the diverse types of arguments employed in the person-situation debate in philosophy, and to examine the effects the debate has on virtue ethics.

II. RELATED WORK

A. Aristotle's Virtue Ethics (Contemporary Explanations) 1) Happiness and the Function Argument

The foremost inquiry that could occur to modern minds is why Aristotle describes happiness objectively as an ultimate and self-sufficient end. While it may suit well into Aristotle's line of thought, one might undercut his definition by explaining their own interpretation: happiness is hinged on the agent's own interpretation and standards of life. Some persons may be utterly happy being rich but without friends, others underprivileged but with a lot of friends. No one 'objective' interpretation of happiness can be set.

Richard Kraut[5] explicates that the variance between the modern interpretation of happiness and Aristotle's objective interpretation of happiness indeed depends on a variance in standard. The modern idea of happiness is that it comprises of the life individuals would like to lead. It comprises of the standard and goals persons have set for themselves [5]. In line with Kraut, this does not entail that happiness, in the modern sense, is simply subjective; one would be averse to call a man who regards friendship happy when his 'friends' are insincere about the way they feel about him. The argument is that in modern notion of happiness people critic someone's happiness in line with their own standards of happiness [5], although Aristotle's notion obviously varies from this modern interpretation. For Aristotle, the thorough realization of ones' desires only is not sufficient. These desires also must to be focused on goals that are valuable [5]. Nevertheless, these goals are not subjective, but objective, thoroughly linked to the function of a human being. The inquiry, then, is why Aristotle would contemplate that human beings have a function. He draws a comparison between other things around, such as an eye and an artist, to demonstrate that these have a function [6], but it does not routinely follow from this that human beings, as human beings, also have a function. How should this be construed? Rachel Barney clarifies that for Aristotle, the function of something does not entail that it is superior in that particular task than anything else. For instance, the function of a knife (cutting) is not its function for the reason that it is good or best at it. Instead, the function of something (or someone) is chunk of Aristotle's teleology: "for Aristotle, to say that a human being has function is to say that a human being has a nature, and end, a characteristic activity, and also a distinctive excellence and good"[7,8]. Someone's or something's function comprises of an action whose realization has core value.

Kraut and Barney's explains; although interpretations help clarify how and why Aristotle's view on happiness differs from the modern view. Aristotle's view on happiness is connected to his teleology: humans have a explicit function or 'task' they should realize, and Eudaimonia is a state in which a human being has realized (or better; is realizing) his task. Happiness in the Aristotelian sense is thus objective: it is the kind of life a human being should live so as to realize its purpose. The modern interpretation of happiness, nevertheless, is much more subjective. Human beings judge a person's happiness in line with his or her own standard, not some objective standard that is linked to a teleological interpretation on life. To comprehend Aristotle's virtue ethics entails that one should be aware of this variance between his interpretation of happiness and the modern interpretation on happiness.

2) The Relation Between Moral Virtue and Practical Wisdom

Aristotle appears to suggest that moral virtue and practical wisdom are communal; without one the other cannot be had. Also, that the possession of practical wisdom heralds the other virtues [6]. How, then, should the link between

moral virtue and practical wisdom be construed? John M. Cooper expounds how one could construe this. As stated by Cooper, “any knowledge about, say, the values involved in courage (as a way of feeling about and reacting to dangers) and in courageous action must see the place of these values in a single overall scheme of moral or ethical goods and bads, including all those involved in all the other ethical virtues” [9]. All virtues employ knowledge and this knowledge is very similar in every single virtue. Aristotle underscores that all virtues employ knowledge: a virtue is only apt when it is steered by thought. Cooper therefore confirms that the virtues need a basic rationality that is identical for all of them. Nevertheless, he adds that this rationality is not the lone constituent of complete virtue. The moral virtues are furthermore necessary to have the right feelings and to not query one’s thoughts. The link between moral virtue and practical wisdom is therefore communal.

3) *Moral Development*

More can be assumed about why moral virtue is cultivated by habit, and what the purpose of practical wisdom is in the cultivation of moral virtue. To comprehend Aristotle’s assessment of moral education, one must look at a distinction he makes between ‘the that’ and ‘the because’ [6].

As stated by both Burnyeat [10] and Curzer [11], a person who has ‘the that’ recognizes or considers that something is so, though a person who has ‘the because’ also comprehends why something is so. As Burnyeat explicates, the person who recognizes ‘the because’ is the man who possesses practical wisdom and recognizes what to do in any specified situation because he comprehends why, for instance, an act is moral or just. The individual who possesses ‘the that’ does not hold this awareness, but has co-opted ideas on justice and nobility [10]. Being virtuous comprises both ‘the that’ and ‘the because’, for the virtuous person accomplishes virtuous things “in full knowledge of what he is doing, choosing to do them for their own sake, and acting out of a settled state of character” [10]. From the assessment Aristotle had on moral education; all one learns has a beginning point. Through insight, one learns that fire is hot, and through instruction, one learns that everyone eats (or in any case should eat if one desires to stay alive). Ethics also has its own beginning point for understanding ‘the that’: habituation. Through the right form of nurture and habituation, one learns what is moral and just by doing moral and just acts. Habituation is not a kind of acclimatizing; it is not a comatose course in which given acts implore certain feelings of morality and justice. The course of habituation has a cognitive part as well: one actually learns what is good and moral by deed [10]. Through habituation one discovers that what teachers and other authority figures have said (that some things are just and noble) is actually true. If one has gotten to this point, such has insight of ‘the that’. The purpose of habituation is to morally develop someone’s character to identify the truth of the moral virtues, and to show him to value them

for it. This, nevertheless, does not entail that he already holds the moral virtue. Virtue in the austere sense also entails practical wisdom.

Understanding that something is so does not suggest that one recognizes why it is so, but one needs to have ‘the that’ before one can have ‘the because’. As stated by Burnyeat, having ‘the that’ involves distinguishing the virtues and loving them for what they are: just and moral. One must comprehend this before one can cultivate his intellectual capacities (that is; practical wisdom) because there is a variance between the person who has grasped what is good and moral and the person who loves the virtues and embraces them for their own sake. The later has been taught to recognize why the virtues are just and moral and, based on this awareness, is able to “tell what is required for the practice of the virtues in specific circumstances” [10]. As stated by Burnyeat, ‘the because’ is communicated in a more theoretical kind of mode, through Aristotle’s lectures, for instance [10].

Burnyeat’s description of ‘the that’ and ‘the because’ additionally explains the different ‘stages’ of moral development. Moral virtue is cultivated through a course of habituation. This course is not a kind of conditioning but has a cognitive part. One learns to distinguish the truth of the moral virtues and co-opt them. Still, to be virtuous one also must know why the virtues are just and moral, and to love them for their own sake. This next ‘stage’ of moral development is further cognitive and is cultivated through teaching and practice. In line with Burnyeat, the teaching Aristotle references are his lectures. As stated by Aristotle, only somebody who has already been habituated in the right fashion and has ample experience will be alert to these lectures.

B. Situationism

1) The Situationists’ Main Thesis

Philosophical situationism can be potted as a method where certain philosophers; recognized as situationists; employ outcomes from psychological experiments to criticize the reality or impact of the virtue ethical concepts of character and virtue. Instead, situationists claim that external situational undercurrents are the core impact on people’s behaviour and decision-making. To clarify the situationists’ main thesis it might be best to look at the following example. Imagine Emeka: a thirty-year-old man, happily married, and father of two. Emeka works for a school and in his spare time he volunteers at his local church. Now imagine Femi: also a thirty-year-old man, in a relationship but with no children. Femi works for a big bank in Lagos, enjoys to make money and to party, cheats on his girlfriend, and sometimes uses some recreational drugs. Further imagine that both of these men find themselves in the following location: while walking through a mall someone in front of them drops a stack of papers that is in danger of being blown away. The question is: how will Emeka and Femi react? The most likely answer is that Emeka would probably help to pick up the papers, while Femi would walk past them. Persons base

their judgment and their forecast on the information they got from the example. Emeka is clearly the caring type, while Femi is perhaps best described as the egoistic type. It is therefore most probable that Emeka will help and Femi will not.

Nevertheless, as previously explained, the situationists assert that man's common awareness of character traits, and the impact they have on his behaviour, is centred on a misinterpretation of how his behaviour is influenced. This misinterpretation is what Harman dubs the fundamental attribution error [12,13]. According to Harman, human beings attribute stable character traits, (i.e. the kind of character traits Aristotle writes about that impact man's behaviour across different situations) based on what he labels their common or 'folk' intuition [12, 14]. However if one looks at the empirical psychological indication, it will be seen that there is no basis for the attribution of character traits. In keeping with Harman [12], not only do persons inequitably attribute character traits to people that they (or most) do not possess, but they also do not take (or at least they disregard) the evidence that suggests otherwise. This ignoring of the evidence is what Harman labels the confirmation bias [14]. Together, the fundamental attribution error and the confirmation bias make up an empirically poor account of man's moral psychology. It spotlights a picture of people with character traits that aid them to act unswervingly, and man's grasp of these character traits helps him to forecast their behaviour. Nevertheless, what actually ensues according to the situationists is that man's behaviour is impacted most by external undercurrents, and his character traits (to the extent that he have them) do not impact his behaviour in any significant way.

2) *The Experiments*

Two experiments that are employed commonly as evidence to back the claims of the situationists are; the Milgram experiment and the Good Samaritan experiment. While these two experiments are half a century old, they are still commonly used as evidence for the situationists' thesis, and critiqued by those who debate against situationism [2,14,15,16,3,17,18]. These experiments therefore play a significant role in the philosophical person-situation debate and elucidating these experiments will aid expound the situationists' thesis.

a) *The Milgram Experiment*: The format of the experiment was as follows: forty green male subjects between the ages of twenty and fifty reacted to an announcement or direct mail solicitation to join in an experiment on the consequence of punishment on learning, which was essentially Milgram's obedience experiment. When they got to Yale University, the subjects were given a reason for the experiment, in which they were told that the goal of the experiment was to discover what the consequence of punishment on learning was. The experiment entailed a learner and teacher. To decide who would have which role, the subjects were introduced to an collaborator (of course the subjects were not aware of this)

and they both picked out a piece of paper. The paper pick out was arranged to always give the subject the role of the teacher and the collaborator the role of the learner. Once the roles were established, both the subject and the collaborator were taken to an adjacent room where the learner was strapped to an electric chair. For additional integrity, the learner asked the experimenter if the shocks he would be given were safe, to which the experimenter responded: "although the shock can be extremely painful, they cause no permanent tissue damage" [19]. The subject was then ushered to a different room and the learner was snarled to the chair.

After this preliminary arrangement, the subject saw himself in a room with an experimenter. In front of the subject was a contributory panel of a shock generator with thirty switches tagged from fifteen to four hundred and fifty volts. Each switch specified fifteen volts advanced than the preceding one, and each group of four switches was tagged as: slight shock, moderate shock, strong shock, very strong shock, intense shock, extreme intensity shock, and danger: severe shock. The subjects were assigned the task to read words pairs to the learner and then read only the first word and give four choices. The learner had to provide the accurate combination by pressing one of the four buttons in front of him, which would light up at the top of the shock generator. If the learner made a blunder, he would get a shock from the subject. One significant component of this task was that the subjects had to increase the level of volts after each incorrect answer (starting with fifteen volts). What the subjects was not aware of was that, just like the drawing of the roles, the shock generator was also rigged. The collaborator/learner did not really get a shock, he only faked a response. To certify that the format was reliable, the subjects all got a forty-five volt sample shock to the wrist.

The goal of the experiment was to observe how far subjects would go in shocking the learner afore disobeying the experimenter. During the experiment, the subjects got prearranged rejoinders from the learner and the experimenter. The learner would hit on the wall after a three hundred volt shock was given, after which his answers would not light up on the shock generator. He would strike again at the three hundred and fifteen volt charge, after which all would be silent, plus a lack of answers appearing on the shock generator. After the initial pounding on the wall, most subjects would observe the experimenter for direction but were encouraged to maintain shocking the learner notwithstanding the lack of answers. The experimenter had only four rejoinders, all said in a "firm, but not impolite" [19]:

1. "Please continue." / "Please go on."
2. "The experiment requires that you continue."
3. "It is absolutely essential that you continue."
4. "You have no other choice, you must continue." [19]

This was a static order of reactions. If the foremost did not work, the experimenter would apply the second, and so on.

If the subject declined to act after the fourth comment, the experiment would be called to a stop. The experiment would also halt when the extreme shock was given. Before the experiment, Milgram anticipated (as did fourteen senior psychology students who were asked to give their prediction) that only a trivial ratio of the subjects would administer the highest shock. The upshots nevertheless, were quite diverse: of the forty subjects, twenty six obeyed the experimenter till the end, five subjects halted after the three hundred mark (the collaborator would strike on the wall), four subjects given one shock after that before rejecting to go on, two subjects halted at the three hundred and thirty mark, one subject on the three hundred and forty five mark, one on the three hundred and sixty mark, and one at the three hundred and seventy-five mark.

From these results, Milgram discovered two outcomes. The first outcome was that while the subjects had learned from childhood forward that it is morally wrong to upset people against their will, most of them still kept on with the experiment until the conclusion, in spite of displaying their disapproval. This was remarkable because even the experimenters, who were present during the experiment, could not believe the pure strength of obedience that was demonstrated. The second finding concerned the influence the experiment had on the subjects; they displayed great anguish while carrying out the experiment, varying from perspiring and mumbling to uninhibited laughing.

b) The Good Samaritan Experiment: In 1973, Darley and Batson [20] carried out an experiment to observe the impact of situational dynamics and personality on aiding behaviour. For the experiment, variance in personality was recognized in terms of religiosity. The variance in situation that is applicable for this thesis is the level of urgency of the subjects.

The outcomes of the experiment were that understanding a task-relevant message or an aiding-relevant message did not impact the aiding behaviour of the subject. Neither did the religiosity of the subjects. The experimenters projected that being engaged with a story about aiding someone in need (the Good Samaritan parable) would impact aiding behaviour but, judging from the outcomes, this did not appear to be the case. The only upshot on aiding that was substantial was the extent of haste the subject was in. Forty percent of the subjects gave assistance in some manner or another, while sixty percent did not. Of the forty percent that assisted, sixty-three percent were in a little-haste, forty-five percent in an intermediary-haste, and ten percent were in an extraordinary-haste state.

Darley and Batson resolved that being in a haste reduces the chance of assisting somebody in need: "it is difficult not to conclude from this that the frequently cited explanation that ethics becomes a luxury as the speed of our daily lives increases is at least an accurate description" [20]. This, still, does not tell one why someone in a hurry does not aid someone in need; does he fail to spot the person in need or does he merely choose not to assist?

Fortunately, Darley and Batson deliberate on this question. In the interview and chat after the experiment, some subjects who were in a haste did admit that the victim was in need of assistance, but they only did this when reflecting on what occurred. During the experiment, they did not appear to discern. Some of the subjects established from these considerations that it would be wrong to say that they basically chose not to assist. According to them, a more true explanation of the circumstances was that "they did not perceive the scene in the alley as an occasion for an ethical decision" [20]. For other subjects, the correct account was that they basically chose not to assist. This, too, does not actually describe the situation to the full degree; why did they choose to desist from assisting? They perhaps did not desist from assisting per se; they were already in the course of assisting the experimenter with the experiment, and he was counting on the subject for the experiment to make it. Consequently, instead of concluding that the subject basically chose not to assist at all, the actual issue would appear to be that the subject was in conflict about assisting.

The most significant conclusion drawn from the Good Samaritan experiment is that the enquiry of whether or not a person assists is a decision that is made directly and most impacted by situational undercurrents.

3) *Situationists on Character*

Harman and Doris assert that one would imagine, based on the attribution error, that the subjects of the Milgram experiment would disobey the experimenter before the jolts got too extreme. One would also suppose that most of the subjects in the Good Samaritan experiment would assist the person in need. Nevertheless, what these experiments demonstrate, according to Doris and Harman, is that man appears to be misguided in the existence and influence of character traits on his behaviour. The outcomes of these experiments appear to recommend that not persons character traits, but the (morally inapt) external situational undercurrents are the central influence on persons (moral) behaviour.

Doris reasons against what he labels a 'globalist' outlook on character and character traits. This globalist outlook is based on Owen Flanagan's description of global character traits [21]. Flanagan expounds that a global trait is a trait that is constant all through different situations (cross-situationally stable or consistent). People apply these global traits in their language to designate some "minimal core or default meaning" [21]. People all comprehend what someone means when he labels someone courageous, even if they do not recognize the specifics of how he is courageous. He could, for instance, be somebody who fought off robbers, or somebody who fought against cancer. One therefore employ these global character traits to show some sort of stability in somebody's behaviour. If somebody is recognized to be honest, people assume him to be honest today as well as tomorrow, at home as well as in court. These global traits, nevertheless, are not entirely situation free: "a global trait ascription can seem to imply,

but cannot on reflection be taken to imply, a trait which is totally situation insensitive—that is, a trait that is displayed no matter what [...] happily, there just are no such traits. On any reasonable view traits are situation sensitive” [21]. For Flanagan, global character traits are traits that are, to some degree, situation free and refer to some default meaning. The concept of global character traits is a significant facet of Aristotelian virtue ethics. As stated by Aristotle a virtuous agent will act from his firm/steady and constant character. What this entails is that whatever the situation, an honest person will perform honestly when the circumstances evidently ask for it. Nevertheless this interpretation on character is precisely the assessment Doris challenges [2].

Doris [2] backs an assessment on moral behaviour where behaviour is not unswerving, but greatly impacted by (morally irrelevant) external situational undercurrents. Character traits are not vigorous and cross-situationally unswerving, but local and situation-specific. Also, the character of a person is uneven rather than incorporated. Hence, rather than relying on the character traits of a person to envisage and describe their behaviour, one should look at the situational undercurrents. Grounded on these outcomes, Doris concludes that situationism provides a better psychological underpinning for normative thought than virtue ethics.

4) *Situationists on Moral Reasoning and Practical Wisdom*

Merritt, Doris, and Harman [22] reason against Aristotelian practical wisdom centred on the upshots of experiments in psychology. Aristotle describes practical wisdom as “a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good and bad for man” [6]. Taylor [23] describes that practical wisdom is man’s cognisant judgment that aids one choose the mean in a situation, makes one conscious of the significant moral features, and ‘guides’ one towards their goal of happiness. Merritt, Doris, and Harman reason against this cognisant and rational moral consideration, claiming that the cognitive courses that impact people’s behaviour are both considerably automatic and unreflective. Their interpretation on moral deliberation thus diverges considerably from the Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom.

5) *Situationists’ Alternatives to the Virtue Ethical view on Character and Practical Wisdom*

So far, the situationist proposal has created a rather disconsolate prospect. It has been discovered that, according to Doris, the globalist or virtue ethical assessment on character does not conform to the empirical proof, and that the character traits that do occur are only local. In keeping with Merritt, Doris, and Harman, most of the cognitive courses that impact people’s behaviour are automatic and are not in line with their moral beliefs or dispositions. Centred on these conclusions, Merritt, Doris, and Harman [22] and Doris [2] recommend certain adjustments to form a more empirically sufficient

explanation of man’s moral decision-making course and his moral assessment. Doris asserts that if one takes the situationist assumptions at heart, one would not appraise people in terms of vigorous character traits because they are “unreasonable standards to expect actual persons to approximate” [2]. Doris employs Bernard Williams’ ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ concepts [24] to clarify that the characterological language people apply is not only non-evaluative but also evaluative. As Doris construes Williams, a dense concept (such as ‘courageous’ and ‘honest’) has both an evaluative and non-evaluative aspect. A reedy concept is only evaluative, such as ‘goodness’ or ‘rightness’ [25].

In line with Doris, the problem with applying thick concepts with virtue ethical undertones is that they increase hopes that are too high. By evading the application of vigorous character traits to appraise someone’s behaviour, people can form a more empirically sufficient evaluative language. One could, for instance, apply a language of local character traits to appraise someone’s behaviour. This way, one still applies dense concepts, but these will be more empirically sufficient. Doris distinguishes that man’s evaluative language can become unfeasible if he applies dense concepts like “dimefinding-dropped-paper compassionate” [26]. He thus expounds that people can employ dense ethical concepts, like ‘honest’, in certain situations without chancing expecting a perverse standard of behaviour. One could, for instance, call their mechanic an honest mechanic because he does not fib about the cost of repairing the car. In keeping with Doris, the evaluative dense concept ‘honest’ in this instance has such a constricted connotation that it does not involve honesty in other aspects of the mechanic’s life. The point, in line with Doris, is that people should rest applying dense virtue ethical concepts because their empirical dearth often leads to “unfair condemnations, on the one hand, and unwarranted approbation, on the other” [26]. The next situationist adjustment is suggested by Merritt, Doris, and Harman [22] as well as Doris [26]. To gratify the situationist evaluation, one should readdress their ethical consideration. Rather than trying to cultivate vigorous character traits to decide one’s behaviour, one should pay more consideration to the impact of situational features. One should also attempt to construct cyclical social circumstances, while evading situations that can impede unsolicited moral behaviour. Doris [26] expounds that rather than attempting to cultivate vigorous character traits, one would do well to apply more of their energy in addressing the pertinent situational features and their impact. If one really want their behaviour to be morally appropriate, they should dodge morally undecided situations where there is a large threat of ‘sinning’. In ‘cold’ situations; i.e. situations that are not morally frustrating because of the situational undercurrents; one should take their time to contemplate about the morally ‘hot’ (or dubious) situation that lies ahead. For when one find themselves in a ‘hot’ situation, their moral consideration will be both automatic and unreflective, however a ‘cold’ situation provides them the chance to

observe a 'hot' situation from all angles. Here one has the opportunity, in line with Doris, to reflect on how one should behave, while in the sizzling situation they will not have an option to reflect because of the (regularly unrecognized) situational influences.

6) *The Scope of Situationism*

A concluding significant facet of situationism is its scope. In line with Doris, the assertions he makes are about moral psychology, which is empirical, or as Doris dubs it: practical. He is in struggle with these 'practical' contentions to ethical assertions, which are contentions about value and moral conduct [26]. Doris dubs his situationist explanation conservatively revisionary, because he only problematizes those features of ethical thought that are linked with characterological moral psychology, but he desists from arguing what values one should hold [26]. In other words, his assertions remain mostly on the empirical or practical side of ethical theories; he contests the, in his eyes, insufficient moral psychologies of ethical theories, but he does not contest the values or norms these ethical theories promote. At the core of this difference between 'practical' moral psychology and 'theoretical' ethical theory is Doris' interpretation on the latitude of each of these 'domains'. In keeping with Doris, the (conclusions from the) theoretical deliberations rarely show up in one's recommendations on how to behave in specific situations, because they are too broad [26]. Requirements, virtues, etc. are frequently tough to employ as procedures in specific situations because they do not account for the individual features of each situation that distinguish one situation from the other. Conflicting to these common theoretical deliberations and conclusions, the situationists' 'practical' moral psychology informs one something about how they make their decisions, and is thus better able to aid one judge and act better, for it describes why people do what they do. This, in turn, can be used as a 'manual' for imminent moral situations, regardless of any enduring 'theoretical' discussion on values. In other words, Doris extricates between the ethical argument on values that should inform one's conduct but is too broad to have actual practical use in explicit situations, and the moral psychological conversation on how one acts and why, which can better inform one's behaviour in specific cases. Doris pens that this is not to say that the theoretical conversation on the kind of values one should embrace have no value at all, or that these 'domains' are severely separated. In line with him, these ethical 'theoretical' deliberations "may be important in their own right, and they may sometimes show up in the form of substantive disagreement on cases" [26]. Nevertheless, Doris leaves it there and he does not go into detail on how these deliberations can be significant in their own right. At the same time, Doris is attentive that the deliberations on people's moral psychology and on the values they should embrace are symbiotic and that they impact each other. Moral psychological concepts, for instance, can inform the kind of values one should genuinely be able to embrace. If the moral psychology that virtue ethics assumes does not house the ethical values and behaviour it suggests (as Doris

asserts it does not), a gap appears between the kind of behaviour one anticipates and want, and the kind of behaviour that is likely for human beings. A gap that, in line with Doris, can be filled by articulating a more empirically sufficient moral psychology: the situationists' moral psychology.

7) *Different Strategies to Reply To Situationism*

One can extricate three diverse positions in the philosophical person-situation debate: 1) a defence of virtue ethics that rebuffs the situationists' assessment, 2) an acknowledgement of the situationists' assessment and a rebuff of the virtue ethical moral psychology, and 3) a substitute that syndicates the two earlier positions into one 'hybrid' or reconciliatory position. The virtue ethical responses to situationism can be shared into two (general) strategies: a methodological and a conceptual critique on situationism.

a) Methodological Strategy: The assertions of Doris and the situationists have triggered modern virtue ethical philosophers. These rejoinders can usually be separated into two sorts: those who concentrate on questions about the situationists' methodology, and those who emphasize on the situationists' understanding and description of the Aristotelian concept of character.

- *First Methodological Response: How to Construe the Data*

Sabini and Silver [16] denote the same experiment accomplished by Hartshorne and May [27] as Doris. Hartshorne and May evaluated the cheating behaviour of schoolchildren. They discovered that there was no solid link between one form of cheating and another. For instance, children would cheat by copying the answer key, but would not cheat by remaining to write after the time bounds for taking the test was up. The inference Doris draws from this experiment is that his experiment demonstrated that the assessment of vigorous character traits should be substituted by local character traits. Sabini and Silver, nevertheless, form a dissimilar argument. During the experiment, Hartshorne and May evaluated the cheating behaviour of schoolchildren and discovered that there was no solid link between one form of cheating and another form. They also distinguished that their exhibition of honest behaviour between circumstances indicated little link; most of the children cheated some of the time, and (almost) none cheated all of the time or none of the time. These outcomes are in agreement with a standard idea that the link from one situation to another in the personality sphere seldom surpasses .3, and most of the time is closer to .2 [16]. From these discoveries, Doris and other situationists determine that there is no unswerving behaviour across situations. Yet, rather than construing this correlation as asserting the situationists' claim, one can also conclude that there is a link since no one will assert that the link is zero. The question therefore becomes: is a .3 or .2 link really that small when one considers what is being studied? Sabini and Silver assertion that these links are perhaps not too small at all. Using a baseball instance

(the fluttering average of two hitters), they indicate that these links have projecting power in the long run, though not with explicit situations. Considering the short term, people typically overvalue the steadiness of human behaviour, just as they overvalue the steadiness of a hitter in Major League Baseball; nevertheless, in the long run steadiness does divulge itself. The fluttering average of the hitter might not aid to envisage whether he will hit the next ball or not (short term), but it will aid a scout to choose whether or not to recruit the hitter (long term). The same goes for trait steadiness; it might not aid to envisage whether someone will be honest in the next trait pertinent situation, but it will aid to envisage a trend of trait-relevant behaviour.

More significantly, Sabini and Silver assert that “correlations from one situation to the next are only distantly related to what we really want to know” [16]. Hence, what do people measure when they apply parallels? What is being evaluated in an experiment like Hartshorne and May’s honesty assessment is a seeming relation in a whole group of subjects. In this explicit experiment, the link between the possession (or absence) of an honesty trait in diverse situations is evaluated. A +1.00 link entails that both variables that are being evaluated alter similarly. Nevertheless, this is not what one wants to know from a virtue ethical angle. One does not want to evaluate the whole group, but only those persons that are virtuous. As Sabini and Silver [16] clarify: “that’s how correlations work; they consider the consistency of the virtuous and the not virtuous together. But virtue ethics does not require that those without substantial virtue be consistent in their transgression.” The link being searched for in these experiments is between virtue and virtue explicit behaviour.

If one looks at the Good Samaritan experiment, one can also observe how this assessment applies here. In a manner, people are forced to agree that seminary students that were in a high hurry situation assisted less than students who were in a low hurry situation (ten percent versus sixty-three percent). Nevertheless, from these facts the situationist concludes that character traits, as cross-situational and steady traits, do not exist. How do they explain for the ten percent that did assist, regardless of being in a hurry? Do the outcomes here tell the whole story? Does the link between the hurry state of the student and his assisting behaviour actually tell one that character traits do not exist, or do they only indicate that people assume too much from steady behaviour in relation to character traits? It seems that some people, although not many, do appear to act in a way that one imagines and this is something the situationist requires to be able to clarify.

- *Second Methodological Response: The Confines of the Experiments*

A dissimilar methodological critique on situationism is that a link can be tainted by many diverse undercurrents. What one needs is a better psychological description to actually expound the link between character traits and trait specific

behaviour: all that has been evaluated thus far is the relation between two variables, without looking at other likely variables or impacts. It could simply be the case that subjects have conflicting dispositions that are at work at the same time. Diana Fleming [27] expounds how the situationist experiments omit some imperative information. She pens that while it is real that the features of a situation impact one’s behaviour, it is not conceivable to conclude from this that only these features root one’s behaviour, but this is the only thing that is being evaluated in these experiments. What is vital to reminisce is that the manner one sees the world, or construes a situation, forms the impact and response he or she has to a particular situation. So what (at most) is evaluated in the Good Samaritan experiment is not that people do not possess character traits, but that these traits are more situationally sensitive than people have anticipated so far and more sporadic than they thought. Nevertheless, this conclusion diverges from Doris’ conclusion because he asserts that man’s character traits has no real impact at all. Fleming’s assertion is unswerving with the assertion Sabini and Silver make, that people typically overvalue how steady human behaviour is, and that a link of .2 or .3 appears adequate to grasp onto character traits.

- *Consequences of the Methodological Critiques for Situationism*

The virtue ethical methodological critiques could increase some essential (methodological) problems for the situationists. Primarily, there appears to be a link between personality traits and trait pertinent behaviour. Steadiness is more probable to express itself over an extended period of time, but the situationists’ experiments are all short-term experiments and are thus not expected to demonstrate these links in their upshots. Secondly, the experiments are restricted in a number of ways. On the one hand the situationists only see behaviour without seeing other likely (psychological or narrative) accounts. On the other hand, what is being evaluated is a link, which informs one that there is a link between two variables, but not that one variable causes the other (which is something the situationists do indicate).

Since the situationists put great weight on the upshots of the psychological experiments and the suggestions drawn from them, these methodological assessments can be an essential blow to their position. If the cogency of the experiments can be probed, the central pillar on which situationism is built will dissolve and situationists will have practically no indication to back their assertions. The situationists will thus either have to alter their methodology to support for these criticisms, or embrace their methodology.

b) Conceptual Strategy: Aside the methodological strategy just expounded, there is a more distinguishing virtue ethical strategy that employs the Aristotelian conceptual awareness of character and virtue to reason against situationism. This strategy concentrates on the span and comprehensiveness of the Aristotelian and virtue

ethical conception of character and virtue, and is in conflict with this more rounded awareness of character and virtue to the tapered explanation of character by the situationists. The situationists' understanding of character diverges considerably from the virtue ethical explanation of character and virtue. This strategy is consequently recognized as the 'anti-behaviouristic' objection [3]; it critiques the tapered and nearly behaviouristic way; people continually respond in a stereotypical way to stimuli; the situationists construe character.

- *Inclusiveness of Aristotelian Character and Virtue*

The central argument of the conceptual strategy is that Aristotelian character and virtue is more multifarious than what people evaluate in behaviour; it entails, among other things, of what values people embrace, how they see of the world, how they see of a situation, what their emotions are, and what their beliefs are [3]. All these courses and undercurrents cannot (constantly) be discovered in the kind of behaviour people ultimately display. Moreover, philosophers that employ this strategy to assert that even if people do not act virtuous, this does not imply that virtue does not exist. It denotes that they might be evaluating the wrong way, or that virtue is something that is tough (or impossible) to evaluate. Rachana Kamtekar [15] asserts that the situationists only distinguish character and character traits as "independently functioning dispositions to behave in stereotypical ways, dispositions that are isolated from how we reason" [15]. Kamtekar mentions the Milgram experiment to support her point; based on the behaviour of the subjects the experimenters resolved that most people do not have the unchanging character trait of not hurting blameless people. They made these inferences through observing the behaviour of the subjects. Yet, Milgram also noted that the subjects started to perspire and shudder during the experiment. This shows that the subjects were experiencing some (mental and emotional) courses that impacted their behaviour, and could even be part of their character, but that did not ultimately confirm in their behaviour. In line with Kamtekar, this instance from the Milgram experiment demonstrates the challenge with the situationists' assessment of character; they anticipate a character trait to evidence itself in a stereotypical way, without considering other psychological descriptions that could also expound the behaviour. Meaning, "the character trait will determine behaviour in isolation from other character traits, thoughts, concerns, and so forth [that] a person might have in a situation" [15]. Aristotelian character and virtue, nevertheless, is more multifarious than what one evaluates in behaviour; it comprises, among other things, of what values people embrace, how they see the world, how they understand a situation, what their emotions are, and what their beliefs are [3]. All these courses and undercurrents cannot (constantly) be discovered in the kind of behaviour people ultimately demonstrate, which entails that the situationists' experiments are, founded on conceptual grounds, not prepared to evaluate virtue or Aristotelian character.

- *Stereotypical Reactions as Vices of Excess*

As Kamtekar, Jonathan Webber [29] also reasons against the one-sided interpretation of character used by the situationists, but from a dissimilar perspective. According to Webber, responding in a stereotypical manner (as the situationists would expect to see) is what Aristotle would label vices of excess. Constantly speaking honestly would not be virtuous, for it would collide with other prospects, dispositions, and virtues. Rather, a trait becomes a virtue when it is in line with the other dispositions. It is when people distinguish when to behave, how to behave, towards whom to behave, and why to behave that they become actually virtuous. For Aristotle, there is "a single web of interdependent virtues: full possession of any one virtue means habitually being inclined to behave in a certain way with the right degree of strength in the presence of a certain situational feature, where what is right is relative to [the] strength of one's other habitual inclinations in response to other possible situational features" [29]. As Aristotle pens: "virtue [...] is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by reason, and by that reason by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it" [6]. In other words, virtue comprises of many different facets, most of them relative to the agent. Reason, or practical wisdom, aids people to explain the mean and aids them to express how to behave in their explicit situation, founded on their ultimate goal of happiness. Virtue is thus neither a nonrational disposition nor only evident in one explicit type of action. From a virtue ethical viewpoint, the virtuous person would distinguish, due to his practical reasoning, how, why, and when to behave. This entails that if someone were virtuous, he would respond inversely in every situation because every situation demands a diverse response. All reactions, nevertheless, would be virtuous. This depiction of virtuous and steady behaviour varies from the situationists' assessment on character as presenting itself in stereotypical behaviour.

- *Consequences of the Conceptual Critique for Situationism*

While this strategy is a conceptual one; it evaluates the situationists' conceptual awareness of Aristotelian character and virtue; the power of the strategy comprises of its methodological costs. In line with the virtue ethical cognizance of virtues and character, ones' behaviour unaided does not display whether they are virtuous or not. One cannot conclude from only behaviour and ones' anticipations of behaviour whether somebody is virtuous. Rather, virtue ethicists see the right response. For this, more than just observing behaviour is required. One should not only study their dispositions as part of a network of interconnected dispositions, but also as part of ones' thoughts, reasons, situational dynamics, beliefs, and values. This poses a challenge for the situationists' methodology; it reveals that it would be difficult to evaluate the virtue of any action or the virtuous state of any individual by supposing characteristic behaviour and by observing someone's behaviour. However, the

experimental upshots the situationists employ to support their position, are intended (solely) at evaluating behaviour. The situationists therefore miss their mark of overcoming virtue ethics because of their misconception of Aristotelian virtue and character. It is disputed whether it is even conceivable to evaluate somebody's state of virtue. This would entail a long-term experiment, in which the subject's life would have to be logged (his judgments, actions, beliefs, etc. would have to become ostensible one way or another), of which the subject would have to be oblivious, and which would, at the very least, be a breach of the subject's privacy.

c) Reconciliatory Position: Miller claims (founded on experiments like the Milgram experiment) that people usually do not have the virtue ethical virtues and vices to any notch. In the Milgram experiment [19], for instance, most people did not behave either virtuously or cruelly, but presented, extremely diverged behaviour where they shocked a blameless learner to death (if the experiment would be real) but were evidently diverged about it (which shows that they were not cruel people). Founded on the Milgram experiment; and many other experiments; Miller thus concludes that most people do not meet the least threshold to qualify for either the traditional virtues or vices to any notch. Nevertheless, Miller does not refute that some people might qualify [18]. So far, Miller appears to be heading towards the same conclusions as the situationists. Miller asserts that most people do not have the traditional virtues or vices to any notch, the situationists refute that people have virtue ethical or vigorous character traits. Nevertheless, Miller does not want to go as far as the situationists to assert that people appear to 'lack character'. He consequently suggests his own moral psychological explanation to substitute both the situationists' moral psychology, as well as the virtue ethical one.

Miller asserts that people do have character traits, and that these traits do concern the diverse moral domains [18]. These traits, nevertheless, do not look like the traditional concepts of virtue and vice. Take for instance a character trait like hostility. In man's 'traditional' awareness of hostility, someone needs be hostile in a steady and unswerving way; if the situation calls for it, a person with a hostile character trait will most probable behave hostilely. Miller substitutes this traditional assessment on character traits with one he discovers more empirically sufficient: Mixed Traits. Unlike the moral virtues and vices, Mixed Traits comprises of dispositions and views that are both morally affirmative and morally adverse. A 'Mixed Aggression Trait', for instance, is not a form or notch of cruelty, but a multifarious framework of all kinds of mental state dispositions that are linked to hostility. It comprises of views and desires linked to kindness and non-malevolence, but also cruelty and hostility. In short, a Mixed Trait is not varied because it is sometimes virtuous and sometime cruel (to any notch), but because it is constantly neither virtuous nor cruel. In line with Miller, these kinds of Mixed Traits constitute man's character

[18]. Miller therefore underlines the significance of a psychologically sufficient depiction to describe and envisage people's behaviour, and as stated by him, the virtue ethical assessment on virtues and vices is not sufficient. Rather, he suggests his Mixed Trait theory to better clarify and envisage people's behaviour. In line with this assessment, people do not have the traditional virtues or vices, but character traits that comprise of both morally positive and negative features and are impacted by pertinent stimuli. The preeminent way to clarify and envisage a person's behaviour is through a thorough analysis of his Mixed Traits (which comprise of an intricate network of connected mental state dispositions) and the psychological pertinent features (i.e. the pertinent feature for the subject) of a situation.

- *Miller in Relation to the Other Positions*

The power of Miller's argument is that he eludes the virtue ethical conceptual and methodological critiques on situationism on conceptual grounds, while holding the attention on the empirical sufficiency of people's moral psychology. To elude the virtue ethical critiques, Miller provides a more intricate moral psychology that does not only concentrate on the yield of behaviour, but also on all the diverse elements that impact a person and form his moral psychology. For instance, Miller asserts that although some behaviour might appear unpredictable to an experimenter (somebody could be honest at moment X, and dishonest at moment Y), this behaviour could be entirely reliable in the eyes of the subject himself. The way the subject recognizes a situation could thus better expound his behaviour. By proposing this explicit (complex) moral psychology, Miller tails the virtue ethical depiction of man's character as being wide-ranging, but he holds the possibility of evaluating what kind of character a person has by accentuating that people should not only evaluate behaviour, but also probe the perception and impetus of a person. In a nutshell, Miller hinges to both the situationists' support on evaluating behaviour, while embracing for the virtue ethical conceptual and methodological critiques. To demonstrate the point, one can once again observe the Good Samaritan experiment. Most subjects walked right past the person who required assistance. To an experimenter, the pertinent feature of whether a subject would or would not aid was the amount of hurry the subject was in. However, when Darley and Batson enquired from the subjects why they did not assist the person in need, some presented psychological reasons why they did not: they thought that assisting the experimenter was more vital [18]. This shows that the way a person distinguishes a situation might tell people more about his behaviour than just the clinical external undercurrents will. Still, Miller's Mixed Trait theory also distinguishes a frail point; envisaging someone's behaviour becomes almost difficult because of the empirical requirements. Miller clarifies that the preeminent way to envisage someone's behaviour is through a thorough analysis of his Mixed Traits and the psychological significant features of a situation. Nevertheless, there appears to be a (infinite) array of possible combinations of

Mixed Traits, which, in turn, can vary among each other. On the level of the Mixed Trait, John can have a Mixed Hostility Trait that comprises of an extensive high point of the mental state dispositions of cruelty and hostility, and not so much of non-malevolence (even though all of these mental state natures together make up the Mixed Aggression Trait). At the same time, Jane could also possess a Mixed Aggression Trait that varies expressively from John's; her trait comprises of all three of the mental state dispositions in equal notch. Both will respond inversely in the same situation. In other words, a Mixed Trait is too blurred a concept to aid envisage someone's behaviour. Behaviour, nevertheless, is the product of someone's character as a whole, which in turn entails the entire web of Mixed Traits someone has. So Jane might already respond inversely than John does because of a variance in the structure of their Mixed Trait, but she might also have a dissimilar character as a whole (comprising of different Mixed Traits), which will also describe why she responds otherwise. And on top of this variance, there is a third variance; both John and Jane might experience a situation inversely, which could cause dissimilar behaviour. In short, if one wants to get a precise view of how someone will behave, they will have to take in all these diverse undercurrents, which will be arduous to say the least. On top of that, it will be very impractical and not favourable for a theory on how people should behave. Miller claims that his theory maintains an emphasis on the empirically competence of man's moral psychology (and hence follows the situationists), though at the same time accounting for a more intricate and psychologically rounded cognizance of character and character traits, and therefore not getting rid of the concept of character.

III. METHODOLOGY

This work is basically a library research. The research method for data collection is primarily document analysis. This entails meticulously selection and conceptual analysis of publications and researches that have focused on this subject area. These materials are sourced from both primary and secondary studies mainly on: virtue ethics and situationism, while critical method is employed in analysing the data.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A. *Effects of the Person-Situation Debate for Virtue Ethics* 1) *Doris on Psychological Realism:*

Doris' application of psychological realism is vital, especially because of the concerns this interpretation has for the task of ethics. In Doris' assessment, ethics should secure morally appropriate behaviour. This entails that it should be based on a moral psychological realism; people should be able to realize the behaviour that is suggested to them by an ethical theory. In philosophy this understanding has also been potted as 'ought implies can': an agent should be (psycho) logically adept of acting the kind of behaviour that is recommended to him by an ethical theory. For instance, one cannot propose someone to

comprehend his moral obligations from birth, for a baby is not adept of such understanding. The problem with virtue ethics, in keeping with Doris, is that it does not conform to the weights of psychological realism. It does not possess a psychological realistic underpinning and therefore it forms beliefs that cannot be met. In other words, Doris asserts that the moral psychological depiction that ensues from the behaviour one evaluates does not embrace the kind of behaviour the virtue ethicists see as morally appropriate. In line with Doris, the virtue ethicists are, in a way, too requiring in the kind of behaviour they anticipate from human beings. Doris hence recommends that people adjust their moral psychological interpretation to embrace for the kind of behaviour they evaluate, and that they adjust their beliefs to where they anticipate moral behaviour that can be embraced by their moral psychology. To demonstrate this point, a look again at one of Doris' adjustments. Doris asserts that they should be alert in employing 'dense' ethical concepts with virtue ethical implications. Consistent with Doris, these dense concepts entails both an evaluative and a non-evaluative part. If one labels somebody courageous, they do not merely designate the kind of acts he executes (non-evaluative), but they also denote that they support of these acts (evaluative). One supposes a certain behaviour of people they call courageous, which is the challenge Doris has with virtue ethics. In line with Doris, virtue ethics sets beliefs that cannot be met because of the boundaries of the human psychology. Rather, Doris recommends that one replaces these virtue ethical dense concepts with dense concepts that are more empirically sufficient, such as local character traits. This does not only adjust how one appraises people's behaviour, but it also adjusts the kind of behaviour they propose. Doris therefore suggests a very explicit assessment on the relation between moral psychology and ethics, or, in other words, between the kind of behaviour one evaluates and the depiction that arises from these evaluations, and the kind of behaviour they find appropriate and thus propose to people. As stated by Doris, the kind of behaviour one appraises indicates a depiction of their moral psychology, and this depiction should guide the kind of behaviour they imagine of people, and the kind of behaviour they find morally appropriate. These beliefs should be realistic. This interpretation is analogous with Miller's 'minimal threshold'; there are certain necessities someone should meet to possess a certain trait, and these necessities can be evaluated. From these necessities, a picture of man's moral psychology ensues, and what one anticipates of somebody should be embraced by that picture. Doris is cognizant of the variance between psychology and ethics. He sums up this variance in the expression "ethics must not be psychology" [26], by which he entails that there is a variance between 'fact' (psychology and the behaviour one evaluates) and 'value' (ethics and the kind of values they embrace). Doris employs this expression; 'ethics must not be psychology'; to clarify that psychological facts cannot, on their own, form ethical assumptions because the spheres of psychology and ethics diverge. Doris asserts that this does not entail that ethics should not have anything to do with

psychology. Actually, Doris' central assertion is that psychological upshots can be, and are, pertinent to the moral psychological assertions of ethical theories, and they may even aid to adjust the kind of behaviour one advocates to and assumes of others [26]. Therefore, for Doris, an ample psychological explanation should direct people's ethical assessments in the sense that whatever they anticipate of a human being should be within its influences: ought implies can.

2) *The Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism:*

Flanagan underscores the (restricted) scope of PMPR. PMPR only provides as a least requirement that an ethical theory should reflect the limits of being human, and thus should not anticipate behaviour that is humanly difficult. Nevertheless, this does not entail that the behaviour suggested by an ethical theory should "now be realized, or once have been realized, or been realized on average in actual persons" [26]. Particularly the last part of this sentence; 'been realized on average in actual persons'; probes Miller's assertion that 'most people do not possess the traditional virtues or vices', as well as Doris' stress on evaluating behaviour. Seemingly, the fact that most people do not have the character traits virtue ethics suggests does not entail that the characterological assessment of virtue ethics is insufficient. In other words, PMPR does not discard an ethical theory of which one have not yet evaluated that it has been grasped; it only discards an ethical theory that is not (considered to be) humanly possible.

To demonstrate his position, Flanagan provides a virtue ethical instance that disrupts PMPR. In line with Flanagan, a theory that needs a morally outstanding individual to have all the virtues disturbs PMPR for two causes. First, there is no list of all the virtues conceivable and thus one cannot (with conviction) assert that somebody have all the virtues. Next, the idea of some having all the virtues is illogical and would be conflicting; diverse virtuous people possess diverse virtuous, but no one is adept of having all the virtuous because some virtues rule each other out [21]. In short, PMPR restricts an ethical theory only to the degree that the character and motivational structure that is given should be at least supposed conceivable for human beings. This limit is very restricted and does not call that this character and motivational structure is (on average) recognized in actual persons. This, in turn, denotes that the lack of evaluation of virtuous behaviour does not render virtue ethics psychologically difficult. Yet, the lack of assessable virtuous behaviour is one of the central arguments of both Doris and Miller. Flanagan's account of PMPR is hence significant for the person-situation debate because it illustrates that the lack of evaluated virtuous behaviour or vigorous character traits is not yet evidence of the unfeasibility of the virtue ethical ideal.

3) *Psychological Realism and Virtue Ethics:*

According to Aristotle, the virtue ethical ideal of becoming a virtuous person is tough (but not impossible) to realize [6]. Being virtuous entails 'hitting the mark' on how, to

what degree, and towards whom to act. It entails not only the right dispositions, but also reason: to discover the middle is only for him who discerns. Virtue, or being virtuous, is therefore very tough to realize. This, nevertheless, is not to say that the ideal is impossible. The point made here is that the situationists' and Miller's stress on assessable behaviour is narrow. First, it only evaluates a particular behavioural output, not a more rounded assessment on character and behaviour. Second, even if the evaluations of the situationists are precise, it does not discard the virtue ethical characterological moral psychology for it does not have to be evaluated to be conceivable. As Flanagan clarifies, it only requires to be possible under some social procedure, and even if one have not evaluated it now, it does not discard the likelihood that there is a virtuous person. Nevertheless, these defences of virtue ethical psychological realism are 'un-virtue ethical' in a manner. Doris, the situationists, and Miller consider that the behaviour people evaluate tells one something about their moral psychology, and this depiction varies from the moral psychological image the virtue ethicists paint. This, in turn, has imports for how one critic people's behaviour and the moral behaviour one proposes to people. As stated by Doris, the virtue ethicists imagine behaviour and a character that is psychologically derisory, and thus believe too much from people. One can probe this assertion, nevertheless, on the ground that the ideal, even if it is very tough to realize (as Aristotle also references), can be motivational and informative for action. Virtue ethics appears to have a dissimilar perspective on the role of ethics and its link to psychology than Doris and Miller have. Where Doris and Miller highlight the significance of the behaviour people appraise, the virtue ethicist appears to take into account people's moral psychology, but he highlights the significance of the kind of (ethical) norms and values people embrace and expect. In this sense, ethics is further on par with Flanagan's PMPR than Doris appears to suggest; for the virtue ethicist it does not matter so much how people do behave (although his moral psychology should account for it), but on how people should behave. In a way, virtue ethics works as an indication to direct people's development towards virtue. As with any expedition, one gets lost occasionally (even most of the times). Aristotle accepts this when he pens about the struggle of becoming virtuous, but as seen in Flanagan's account of PMPR; that something is challenging does not entail it disrupts PMPR. In other words, virtue ethics, like any theory, occasionally (or most of the time) does not agree with how things really are. An economical model could, for instance, omit the likelihood of banks failing and monetary systems such as the Naira crumpling. Still, this is what occurs (and in the case of the Naira even materialised) in real life. Theory does not (always) parallel to practice. This, nevertheless, does not denote that what essentially ensues should direct a theory. One did not adjust the procedures for banks and the Naira to support the adverse and negative behaviour of bankers before the economic crises, but one changed the behaviour to support the theory. The same angle is applied for virtue ethics. People essentially fail most of the time, but this failing

does not render the application of virtue ethics inane. On the contrary, it demonstrates the need for a theory that clarifies how people should behave. Also, that people do not behave as they should is not an indication that the kind of behaviour they suggest is impossible. At best, it expresses that it is tough.

4) *A Defense of Aristotelian Practical Wisdom:*

The objective here is not to plunge into the argument on autonomy, for this would entail a work of its own, but the point is quite that the assertion of Merritt, Doris, and Harman, that the cognitive courses that define people's behaviour are significantly automatic and unreflective, is still (seriously) deliberated. This deliberation queries the strength of their assertion because Merritt, Doris, and Harman's argument against practical wisdom hinges profoundly on the automaticity of the cognitive courses that impact people's behaviour, which appears questionable at best. The subsequent question is that even if the experimental confirmation indicates that the moral cognitive courses that define people's behaviour are significantly automatic and unreflective, this does not entail that their automatic and unreflective courses are non-rational or irrational. Merritt, Doris, and Harman decide that one can apply the virtue ethical approach of practical wisdom to recommend how people should behave and respond to the degree that the cognitive courses that define people's behaviour are subject to reflective deliberation. People could create mental notes on how they should respond next time they are in similar moral situation. Nevertheless, Merritt, Doris, and Harman do not consider this will have any fundamental effect because of the "limited cognitive resources" [22] that are existing in people's moral cognition. Two things here are remarkable: first, people's moral cognition is not entirely automatic and unresponsive to introspection. Merritt, Doris, and Harman accept this, but this needs to be underlined because, furthermore, Merritt, Doris, and Harman do not explain whether the automatic cognitive courses are non-rational. This is an imperative point for practical wisdom because if people's moral cognition is not entirely automatic, but even more notably, if the automaticity of their cognitive courses does not also denote that they are non-rational, they can train their practical reason in the Aristotelian sense of cultivating it to distinguish the morally pertinent features of a situation.

There is still a dynamic debate in psychology about which cognitive courses are automatic and to what degree. Additionally, the fact that some of man's moral cognitive courses are automatic or bypass their introspection does not suggest that these courses cannot be cultivated to cause dissimilar, more morally appropriate responses. These two points query the strength of Merritt, Doris, and Harman's assertion against practical wisdom and express the possibility and plausibility of practical wisdom.

V. CONCLUSION and Future Scope

In the introduction, this study framed the following research question that it intended to answer: How can

Aristotelian virtue ethicists convincingly respond to the criticism of the situationists? The aim was to present an overview of the types of arguments that are employed in the philosophical person-situation discussion, and deliberate the imports this debate has for virtue ethics. As the research question indicates, It intended to clarify the discussion from a virtue ethical perspective, and defend (if conceivable) virtue ethics against situationism. The result of this approach was that it did not appraise all three positions in the person-situation debate, but only deliberated the positions (particularly the reconciliatory position) to the degree to which they probed virtue ethics. To respond to the research question this work expounded the Aristotelian/virtue ethical interpretation on virtue ethics and character. The response was that in line with Aristotle, human beings possess character traits that are dispositions to respond to and on the passions they feel. People can respond to their passions in a bad, good, or excellent way, and therefore have bad, good, or excellent character traits. The exceptional character traits are what Aristotle labels moral virtue; these are the right dispositions in order to behave appropriately: a mean between flaw and excess. Possessing these dispositions, nevertheless, is not sufficient. People must also possess practical wisdom (an intellectual virtue) in order to distinguish how to behave in a particular situation and to achieve their goal of happiness. The blend of moral virtue and practical wisdom is what Aristotle dubs 'virtue in the strict sense'. A virtuous person, in keeping with Aristotle, distinguishes why and when to behave, and towards whom.

This paper also responded that the situationists reason against the virtue ethical interpretation of character based on the upshots of diverse empirical psychological experiments. Doris and the situationists reason for what they dub an empirically sufficient moral psychology where (morally unbiased) external situational undercurrents are the central stimulus on people's behaviour. Doris' central assertion is that virtue ethics is built on a defective moral psychology, which has imports for the feasibility of the kind of behaviour virtue ethicists advocate to and imagine of people. Rather than this defective characterological psychology, Doris suggests a substitute: a situationist moral psychology. In line with Doris, people are mostly impacted by (morally inapt) external undercurrents and they do not have 'global' character traits but local ones. People should, consistent with Doris, apply this moral psychology (which is more satisfactory than the virtue ethical one) to aid behave and judge better in explicit situations. Also, Merritt, Doris, and Harman reason against the concept of practical wisdom, arguing that the cognitive courses that impact people's behaviour are considerably automatic and unreflective.

This paper deliberated on two lines of virtue ethical responses against situationism: a methodological and conceptual response. From these responses the picture arose that the situationists' experiments are not furnished to evaluate the virtue ethical conception of character. Situationists' tapered awareness of character forms a belief

that character traits display themselves in a standard kind of reaction, but the virtue ethical concept of character is much more inclusive and rounded, comprising of a person's views, desires, emotions, etc. The third position in the person-situation debate: the reconciliatory position can differ, but here it is shown with Miller's Mixed Trait theory. In line with Miller, most people do not have either the virtue ethical virtues or vices. Rather, people have what he dubs Mixed Traits: character traits that comprise of morally positive and negative features. Miller's theory is a reconciliatory theory since, like the situationists, he accentuates the significance of psychological investigation and data, but, like the virtue ethicists, he does not refute or the existence of character or demote its sway.

The Flanagan's Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism (PMPR) and how Doris construes it was also discussed herein. Doris asserts that an ethical theory should be founded on a moral psychology that looks like man's actual human psychology. If an ethical theory, resembling virtue ethics, is not centred on such a moral psychology the behaviour it suggests will be impossible for humans to realize, and the theory will consequently lose its practicality. PMPR was further scrutinised by deliberating Flanagan's clarification of it and established that PMPR is a least requirement that does not denote that the characterological theory of an ethical theory should be grasped now or on average in real persons. This inference has imports for Doris' assertion: virtue ethics only violates PMPR if it is (conceived as) humanly impossible. The situationists or Miller, nevertheless, do not ascertain this. Additionally, ethics is more focused with how people should behave than how they do behave; it acts as an indication to direct people's behaviour. This work hence resolved that the virtue ethical characterological moral psychology might over-stress the strength of man's character traits, and under-stress the impact of external undercurrents that impact people's behaviour. Nevertheless, this is not to say that Doris and the situationists are right in arguing that virtue ethics is founded on an insufficient moral psychology and thus anticipates too much from people.

This work is now in a position to react its research question: How can Aristotelian virtue ethicists convincingly re-join to the criticism of the situationists? The short response is that the virtue ethicists can provide several substantial answers to the criticism of the situationists. With regard to the situationists' assessment on the virtue ethical concept of character, the virtue ethicists can react on both methodological and conceptual grounds to the criticism of the situationists. Particularly the methodological response appears to be practical and essential. Sabini and Silver, for instance indicate that the steadiness in behaviour is not evaluated by the psychological experiments the situationists produce, and Fleming clarifies that the situationists omit some imperative information pertaining to the man's decision-making. From a theoretical perspective, Kamtekar reasons that the virtue ethical idea of character is much more

comprehensive and extensive than the situationists' cognizance of it; it comprises views, desires, emotion, and the way an agent sees of the world and a situation. This misinterpretation has methodological imports; the situationists' experiments are not fortified to appraise this intricate course of decision-making. Rather, the situationists only appraise a (almost behaviouristic) standard response to diverse impulses that do not take into account all the other courses that are at work. More explicitly, the virtue ethicists can reason against Doris' idea of psychological realism. As stated by Doris, an ethical theory should be centred on a moral psychology that looks like man's actual human psychology. If an ethical theory is not constructed on such a moral psychology a gap appears to what humans really can do, and what one expects people to do. In other words, an ethical theory becomes too challenging. Doris centres this fundamental assertion on Flanagan's Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism (PMPR). Nevertheless, virtue ethics does not disrupt PMPR, because the scope of PMPR is very restricted. As Flanagan expounds, PMPR denotes that an ethical should be founded on a moral psychology that is conceivable for human beings, but this does not indicate that the kind of moral character an ethical theory suggests is already grasped or grasped on average in actual persons. It has to be possible under a social construct. Virtue ethics does not disrupt PMPR because situationism has not confirmed that the moral psychology it (virtue ethics) recommends is impossible for human beings. Additionally, virtue ethics is less concerned with the kind of behaviour people really display, and more concerned with the kind of behaviour people should express. It thus presents an ideal that appraises people's conduct and functions as an indication to give them directions. With regard to the situationists' analysis on practical wisdom, the virtue ethicists can answer that there is still an on-going discussion in psychology about which cognitive courses are automatic and to what degree. Moreover, the fact that some of people's moral cognitive courses are automatic or evade their introspection does not indicate that these courses cannot be cultivated to cause unlike, more morally appropriate reactions. These two responses have been discussed to illustrate that Merritt, Doris, and Harman's analysis on practical wisdom is not final, and that there is still a likelihood and plausibility for practical wisdom. Yet, the virtue ethicists do not come out of the debate intact. The situationists' position; in addition to Miller's reconciliatory position; displays that the virtue ethical conception of character and how it impacts people's behaviour is at least exaggerated. The upshots from psychology might not irrefutably demonstrate that the virtue ethical moral psychology is humanly impossible, it does denote that the virtue ethicists may have underestimated the impact of (morally irrelevant) external undercurrents on people's behaviour. This paper considers that the way forward will comprises of co-operation between psychologists and virtue ethicists along the lines of Christian Miller's venture. If psychologists and philosophers do long-term experiments and deliberate diverse conceptual glitches together, they might come

about with a moral psychology that is more ample than either the virtue ethical moral psychology or the situationist moral psychology.

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