Resource Curse, Institutional Quality and Economic Growth: ARDL Analysis

E. Iheanacho¹

Section:Review Paper, Product Type: Isroset-Journal
Vol.4 , Issue.12 , pp.36-44, Dec-2018

CrossRef-DOI:   https://doi.org/10.26438/ijsrms/v4i12.3644

Online published on Dec 31, 2018

Copyright © E. Iheanacho . This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
 

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Abstract :
This study examines the interaction effects between resource curse, institutional quality and economic growth in Nigeria over the period 1986 – 2016 using the auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to co-integration analysis. Controlling for the possible effects of gross capital formation, oil price, credit to private sectors and trade openness on economic activities. This study found that there is a long-run relationship among the variables in all the specifications. Second, the interaction term between oil rent and corruption index were found to be negative and significant, indicating that both reduces economic growth. This coexists with high level of poor governance resulted to a negative impact on income per capita. In general, the results highlight the importance of the institutional quality resource abundance and economic growth in Nigeria. The institutional quality could therefore be the right strategy to lessening the high level oil rent and speedy economic growth in the Nigerian economy.

Key-Words / Index Term :
cointegration, ARDL, resource curse, institutional quality, economic growth

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