BOKO Haram: Its Effects on Socio-Political and Economic Developmentof North-East Nigeria (A Case Study of Borno State)

Amon Rimamtanung Stephen¹ , Isa Hamza²

Section:Review Paper, Product Type: Isroset-Journal
Vol.5 , Issue.6 , pp.53-61, Jun-2019

Online published on Jun 30, 2019

Copyright © Amon Rimamtanung Stephen , Isa Hamza . This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
 

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Abstract :
Nigeria has been facing different forms of security challenges within its territory for over fifty years of existence as a sovereign nation. However, beginning from 1999 when the military which has presided over the affairs of the country in most of these years transferred political powers to a democratically elected government to date, the situation has continue to deteriorate. Prominent among the cause of the worsening security situation in the country is the activities of the Boko Haram insurgent group in the north eastern part of the country. The group which publicly emerged in 2002 has now become a major source of security threat to Nigeria’s internal stability and international community through its indiscriminate attacks on security forces, civilians, and destroying public and private buildings including places of worships worth billions of Naira. This study revealed that Boko Haram insurgency has created so much backwardness, hatred, national disintegration and lack of trust in Nigeria. There is also imposition of Sharia law in some Northern States of Nigeria, this brand of Sharia is opposed by the Boko Haram insurgents and it has affected former President Goodluck Jonathan’s transformational agenda because the money meant for other developmental programmes is channeled to settle and reconstruct projects damaged by Boko Haram insurgency. The government should take adequate measures to shut down all the sect’s training camps completely for the nation to start experiencing peace, national unity, security, development and progress towards a better society.

Key-Words / Index Term :
Boko Haram, Effects, Socio-Political, Economic Development, North-East Nigeria, Borno State

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